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This document describes the design and evaluation of two Erlang-based
instant messenger systems using Distributed Erlang (D-Erlang) and Scalable
Distributed Erlang (SD-Erlang). The purpose of these systems is to serve
as real-world benchmarks to test the performance of the SD Erlang library.
The Erlang programming language was invented by Joe Armstrong,
Robert Virding, and Mike Williams at Ericsson Computer Science Lab in
1986. It was conceived ’as a tool to get the job done’ [Arm07a], being this job
to program the second generation of the Ericsson AXE switches. At the be-
ginning it was a logic programming language, derived from Prolog [AVW92],
designed for ’writting programs that ”run forever”’ [Arm07a], and with the
aim of simplifying the programming of telephony applications. Functional
language features such as list comprehensions or higher-order functions were
added few years later. Similarly, support for distribution was added in 1993,
years after the first release, and used in production for the first time in 1995
with the AXD301 switch [Arm07b].
Today, Erlang is a soft real-time functional language that offers support
for concurrency, distribution and fault tolerance. It also allows the injection
of code updates without having to stop the application.
Scalable Distributed Erlang (SD Erlang) is an extension of the Erlang
distribution model that let push this limit further, allowing the systems to
either scale more, or given the same size, to use less resources than their dis-
tributed Erlang counterparts [CLTG14]. Given the context described above,
SD Erlang is particularly useful to increase the scalability of the IM archi-
tectures. SD-Erlang has been developed in the RELEASE project, within
the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission. The different
tasks performed included the execution of a battery of benchmarks to vali-
date this SD Erlang technology. The results obtained to date show that ap-
plications written in SD Erlang scale better than their D-Erlang equivalents,
penalising neither their performance, nor their reliability models [CLG+15].
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Glossary
Architecture Conceptual model that defines the structure, behaviour and
more views of a system.
Distributed Erlang System (Also D-Erlang System). System formed
out of a number of Erlang nodes that communicate with each other.
The system uses standard features of the Erlang language to write
distributed programs.
Scalable Distributed Erlang System (Also SD-Erlang System). Sys-
tem formed out of a number of Erlang nodes that communicate with
each other. The system uses features of the Scalable Distributed Er-
lang library to write distributed programs.
Process Supervisor Process that monitors all the processes inside the






2.1 Idiosyncrasy of the Erlang/OTP Applications
The concept of Erlang significantly differes from other programming lan-
guages like C or Java. Similarly to other functional languages such as Haskell
the computations are carried out by functions. However, there is a partic-
ular type of functions that remain continuously calling to themselves after
performing some computation. These are called Erlang processes (or simply
processes).
An application in Erlang is basically a collection of processes that inter-
act with each other to implement a set of requirements. The result of these
interactions is, obviously, a certain output. But since Erlang was designed
for fault-tolerance, true applications in Erlang are also implement a super-
vision tree [CT09]. That is, Erlang applications divide the requirements
between different processes that are deployed as a hierarchical implementa-
tion of the supervisor/worker design pattern.
As it happens for any other design-patterns, the workers and supervisors
have very defined structures that usually are common within applications.
For this reason the OTP framework supplies standardised templates for
these tasks called behaviours, that are aimed to help in the implementation
of servers, supervisors, finite state machines and event handlers [CVss].
Behaviours are interesting because they facilitate the reusability of the
code, they uniform the code to a standard and, as they encapsulate some
features of the language, allow developers to focus on the application with-
out having to worry too much for aspects like fault-tolerance or code hot-
swapping. For these reasons industry-standard applications are implemented
using behaviours.
The applications developed for this project do not use behaviours. At
the design stage it was deemed that they would introduce unnecessary com-
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plexity. Instead, the supervision tree is directly embedded in the server logic
of the different processes that perform monitoring tasks.
The rest of the chapter describes the implementation of the instant mes-
senger applications made for the project, the supervision tree, the deploy-
ment sequence, and two auxiliary modules that, although they do not belong
to the applications, have been used during the experimental sessions.
2.2 Architecture of the RD-IM and RSD-IM
At a first glance to the entities involved, there are no differences between
RD-IM and RSD-IM applications. This is true to some extent. It is neces-
sary to look the code inside the processes to perceive how both differ. The
dissimilarities also affect the way these entities are organised and connected
to each other. However, this policy of applying only the necessary changes,
trying to keep the applications the closest possible to each other, ensures
that only the differences between technologies and not the applications are
tested.
The entities of the IM applications are realised in Erlang nodes (Erlang
virtual machines). These nodes host the processes that perform the business
model of the applications.
From the point of view of the architecture, the IM applications follow
a simple client-server architecture. Again, since these are not industry-
standard applications the decision was to keep the things simple, providing
a server layer to support all the IM functions and a client layer to sustain
the traffic generation logic.
2.2.1 Server-Side Nodes
Router. This node is in charge of connecting the client processes to the
servers, so that the chat sessions can happen. In a sense, it is just an
interface between clients and servers. The main type of processes found at
router node are:
 A router process forwards the client requests to the different servers
deployed in the system. When a client logs in, the router finds the
server node to which the client is going to be assigned, and then for-
wards the client request to the server supervisor, which will spawn a
client monitor in that server node. The router process is also respon-
sible for supervising the server supervisor process1.
 On the other hand, the mission of the router supervisor process is
to monitor the router processes. When one router process terminates
unexpectedly, then the router supervisor restarts it.
1Note that the number of router processes must be less than the number of server
nodes.
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 Finally, there is a router supervisor monitor process that monitors the
router supervisor process. These processes actually monitor each other
in a circular way.
Server. The main purpose of the server node is to connect two (or more
clients), thus they can interchange plain-text messages. It hosts three types
of processes for this purpose:
 The server supervisor is the process that ensures the reliability of the
server node restoring any failed process —except for itself—, and thus
the state of the node to the same state as it was before the failure of
the process.
This process also receives and handles the log-in requests, spawning
a corresponding client monitor process. When a client sends a chat
session request, it spawns the chat session process that enables the
communication between the clients.
 chat session process enables the communication between clients. It
forwards the message sent by the sender to the intended receiver. It
also sends a confirmation to the sender of the delivery of the message.
Other responsibilities include register the chat session in the Chat Sessions DB,
when two or more clients start a chat session, and unregister the chat
session from the Chat Sessions DB when the chat session finishes.
 client monitor keeps track of a client while this is logged in to the
system. Hence, its responsibilities are: (i) to register the client in the
Client DB when it logs in, (ii) unregister the client from the Client DB
when it logs out, and (iii) notify the client that it is already logged
in, if this client tries to register in the system while being registered
already.
Server nodes also contains two distributed databases to store the infor-
mation about the clients logged in the system and the running chat sessions
(namely, Clients DB and Chat Sessions DB).
The implementation of these data containers is made through two pro-
cesses that own what is called Erlang Term Storage (ETS) tables, and they
simply act as interfaces between the server processes and the and ETS ta-
bles. This provides protection and integrity to data since any request must
be done sending a message with a prefixed format to the corresponding DB
process. Other messages are simply ignored.
The reasons to use ETS tables instead of, for example, lists of records
are mostly two: they are garbage-collected (providing a more efficient use of
the memory of the host machines) and they are implemented as either hash
tables (providing O(1) access times to items).
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However, ETS tables are linked to the process that created them and
for this reason they are volatile: when the owner process ceases to exist all
the data contained in the ETS tables disappear. Having into account that
the server processes rely heavily on the information stored in the databases,
some replicas of these data structures are created and distributed amongst
neighbouring server nodes.
2.2.2 Client-Side Nodes
Client. The client node hosts the client processes. These can be of two
types: normal and ’doped ’ client.
 Normal client is a simply command-line client that send messages and
prints the received messages to the standard output of the terminal.
 ’doped’ client is a process based on the normal client, that embodies
the traffic generation logic used to stress the IM architectures. The way
this type of client works is fairly simple: the client receives a message
that triggers a conversation with another ’doped ’ client logged in the
system. Then it generates a random string and sends the message
to the receiver client after a random time ranging between 1 and 20
seconds. This simulates the time spent at typing a message.
When a ’doped ’ client receives a message, it generates a reply message
(again a random string), simulates the typing time, and sends the
message to the client that sent the first message.
This is done for a random number of interactions that are specified at
the beginning of the conversation. When the conversation is finished,
the ’doped ’ client notifies this event to the corresponding chat session
process, that terminates as if two normal clients had finished their chat
session.
Client nodes contain a third type of process, called routers DB, that is a
container for the pids of the deployed router processes. From the perspective
of the business logic, this is an auxiliary process. However, it is fundamental
for RD-IM and RSD-IM clients to work, as it provides the client processes
the pid of the routers. This way, clients can communicate to the server layer
of the application.
Traffic Generator. Initially, these nodes are not essential to the IM ap-
plications. They were added after experiencing some performance problems
with the first generation of traffic generator processes.
There were several causes for these problems. These traffic generators
mark 1 were responsible for the message generation/waiting time/sending
logic. Partly because of this, partly because they only kept a record of the
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sender and receiver clients, they only could manage one conversation at a
time. This implied that it was necessary to spawn a massive number of these
processes to generate enough traffic. In addition, they had to be spawned
inside the client nodes. And because they were not coded for efficiency, they
were too greedy resources-wise.
The result of all these circumstances, was that client nodes ended up
running out of memory and the whole traffic generation stopped to work
when the traffic loads were intense.
The solution was then to move the message generation to the clients, and
move lighter traffic generator processes to a different node. Now, these traf-
fic generator processes mark 2 are acting as conversations triggers. Each of
them control up to ten conversations simultaneously, and thanks to moving
this traffic generation logic to an external node, they can generate conver-
sations between clients that belong to two different client nodes. This was
something that the first generation was unable to do.
2.2.3 RSD-IM specific processes
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 describe the nodes found at both RD-IM and RSD-
IM, as well as the processes that implement the business logic of the appli-
cations at these nodes. So far, this is enough to have the DErlang version of
the instant messenger running. In turn, the SDErlang version could work,
but it would fail performing some operations on the client DB and chat DB
processes.
In the case of the RD-IM, these processes are accessed using globally
registered names to find their pid, e.g.:
global:whereis name(process name) ! {message}
Since SD-Erlang modifies these global operations, the equivalent to the
previous statement
s group:whereis name(s group name, process name) ! {message}
would fail if process name refers to some process registered at a different
s group than the group to which the caller function belongs to. This is par-
ticularly problematic when is necessary to access the DB replica processes
(e.g., to recover a DB main process that went down).
The solution was to create a relay process that, essentially, multicast the
message to all the router processes present, since these processes have access
to the registered names at server N group s groups. Hence, when a certain
router process finds the target process, it simply forwards the message. If the
target name is not accessible to the router process, the message is discarded.
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2.3 Supervision Tree
As it was mentioned at the beginning of section 2.2, RD-IM and RSD-IM
are designed to be as closest as possible to each other. Following the general
design principles for Erlang (cf. section 2.1) the two applications have their
supervisor trees, that are the same in both cases. At server-side the hierarchy
is as follows:
 Router supervisor monitor supervises router supervisor.
 Router supervisor supervises Router supervisor monitor and Router
process(es).
 Router process supervises Server Supervisor(s).
 Server Supervisor supervises:
– Client Databases.
– Chat Session Databases.
– Chat session processes.
– Client monitors.
Client-side, the supervision tree is only one level deep: Client monitor
supervises Client processes. Figure 2.1 shows this supervision tree graphi-
cally:
2.4 Deployment and architectural layout
The deployment sequence of the IM applications is is managed by the
launcher module. This is nothing more than a launching script. In the
Figure 2.1: Supervision hierarchy. The arrows indicate supervision.
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case of the RSD-IM, the creation of the s groups and the assignment of the
nodes to these is done at deployment stage.
Thus, the launcher module not only deploys the applications, but also
shapes their architectures. For clarity purposes it is assumed that the ar-
chitectures follow a tree topology. In reality, this is not necessarily true as
in the case of the RD-IM the nodes form a complete graph, and for the
RSD-IM nodes inside the s groups, they are also complete graphs.
Deployment follows an strict sequence determined by the supervision
tree. This is logical as those processes with supervision responsibilities are in
charge of spawning their children processes. Hence, unless explicitly stated,
these steps are the same for RD-IM and RSD-IM:
1. launcher module determines the total number of router processes and
the server supervisor processes that are children of each of these router
processes. Then it creates the router group s group (RSD-IM only)
2. For each router node in the architecture, launcher
 adds the node to the router group s group (RSD-IM only),
 creates a server group s group and adds the router and all chil-
dren server nodes to it (RSD-IM only),
 spawns one router supervisor.
3. This router supervisor
 spawns its own monitor,
 spawns the relay processes (RSD-IM only)
 spawns its children router processes.
4. Each router process then determines its server supervisor children pro-
cesses, and spawns them sequentially.
5. Finally, each server supervisor spawns the corresponding DB pro-
cesses.
When all the server-side processes are launched, the module spawns the
routers DB processes in the client nodes (cf. section 2.2.2).
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict the resulting architectures after the deploy-
ment of the applications. These figures also show the simplification of the
architecture introduced by SD-Erlang. RD-IM uses the default distribution
model provided with Erlang: all the connections between server-side (i.e.,
server and router) nodes are transitive. In the case of SD-Erlang, these
transitive connections are established only inside the s groups. In both ap-
plications, client nodes connections are established as hidden.
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Figure 2.2: Connections in RD-IM architecture (client connections not
shown).
Figure 2.3: Connections in RSD-IM architecture (client nodes not
included).
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2.5 Auxiliary Non-IM modules used for testing
purposes
It is worth of mention two modules that are used to test reliability and to
record the measurements of the benchmarks: the rhesus module and the
logger module.
Rhesus Module. Erlang approaches the error handling according to the
”let it crash” principle. Applications are written in two parts: one that
performs the operations required to solve the problem, and a second that
corrects errors as soon as they arise. This strategy brings several advantages
such as (i) lesser defensive code, (ii) focusing on the recovery of the system
rather than preventing the errors, or (iii) better diagnosis of the failures.
One of the assumptions made after this ”let it crash” principle is that
applications must be able to provide (at least some) functionality under a
failure scenario. It was in order to test whether this assumption held for
their Amazon Web Services, that the engineers at Netflix developed the tool
Chaos Monkey (Bennett and Tseitlin, 2012): ¡¡Chaos Monkey is a service
which runs in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) that seeks out Auto Scaling
Groups (ASGs) and terminates instances (virtual machines) per group¿¿
(´ıbid.).
Chaos Monkey is a tool of great interest within the context of the RD-IM
application for obvious reasons. However, the Netflix version does not quite
fit the requirements as it is node-focused.
There is an alternative implementation of this tool credited to Daniel
Luna2 that is more pertinent to the IM. Luna’s Chaos Monkey differs from
the original in that (i) it is written in Erlang/OTP instead of Java, and (ii) it
terminates instances of processes rather than instances of virtual machines
(nodes). Unfortunately, as the RD-IM application is not using standard
OTP behaviours, this version of the tool turned out to be incompatible.
For this reason, it was decided to build a custom-made module that
shows a similar behaviour to Chaos Monkey. This module, named Rhesus
after the rhesus macaque, has the following features:
 Random termination time for a process ranging from five seconds to
one hour.
 User-defined termination time for a process.
 Weighted termination probability of router/server processes.
 Weighted termination probability of the server processes.
2https://github.com/dLuna/chaos monkey
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The basic principle behind this chaos generation scheme is quite simple.
Rhesus looks for a router supervisor
process and injects termination messages into the architecture. The time
rate at which these messages are sent is either randomly picked at the very
first cycle of its execution, or is passed as a parameter at the call of the
function chaos on/1.
The sequence of steps that rhesus follows to terminate a process is rather
simple:
1. Rhesus chooses to finish either a server process or a router process.
This pick is random, yet the probabilities are 1:4 that a router process
is chosen (hence, 3:4 for the server processes).
2. It sends the appropriate message to the router supervisor process.
3. If the router supervisor receives the instruction to terminate a router
process, it executes an exit/2 passing as the argument the pid of
a selected router process (either router process, router supervisor pro-
cess, or router supervisor monitor process). The probabilities are, in
this case, 1:number of router processes + 2.
4. If the router supervisor receives the order of terminating a server pro-
cess, then it forwards the request to a router process as if it were a log
in request, for example.
5. The router process takes an aleatory pid of a server, and sends the
termination request to be processed.
6. When the process termination request arrives, the server supervisor
process deals the issue in a similar way to how the router supervisor
does. In this case the probabilities are 1:5 for monitored processes DB,
Chat DB, Clients DB, and server supervisor processes, and 1:10 for
client monitor and chat session processes.
This chaos generation logic exploits the fact that there are data struc-
tures that store the pids of the IM processes running on each node. This
makes the implementation fairly straight forward, making unnecessary to
refactor the whole application using OTP behaviours. Besides, the rhesus
module offers an additional advantage compared to Luna’s application: it
sets a priori probabilities for the termination of the processes.
The Erlang/OTP Chaos Monkey does not make any distinction amongst
the different types of process that conform the application. In practical
terms this means that all the processes have the same chances to be termi-
nated. Since the most frequent processes in the IM are client monitors and
chat sessions. If all the processes have the same probability of being finished,
it would be very unlikely to find an scenario in which the elected process
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to stop is not one of those two. Or, similarly, it would be necessary to run
extraordinarily long experimental series to make sure that other processes
than client monitors and chat sessions are stopped. And this is something
not convenient for the present case.
Logger Module. This module provides a measurements-gathering facil-
ity, that is useful to study the performance of the IM applications in terms
of latency and throughput.
The module provide a set of recorder functions that are spawned at
the client nodes whenever data-collection is required. At launch time, they
create a comma separated value (.csv) file to which they write the latency or
throughput data in real-time. When the data collection session has finished,
they just close the file and if there are no more sessions left they terminate.
Recorders can be customised, allowing to specify the name and path of
the output files, the number of series to be recorded, and the length of the
data collection sessions. For throughput measurements, they also allow to
set a threshold in latency that can be used to determine the quality of the
service (defined as percentage of messages delivered below threshold).
2.6 Summary
This chapter reviews the implementation, hierarchy and architecture of the
instant messenger applications. The design of the application follows the
supervision tree principle imposed by the Erlang standards for reliable ap-
plications. Even though behaviours have not been used, process monitoring
is performed.
The supervision tree imposes a hierarchy to both nodes and processes.
It also guides the deployment sequence of the applications.
On the other hand, the resulting architectures after deployment are of a
very different complexity. This is the result of the application of SD-Erlang
technology.
Finally, two auxiliary modules have been described. Yet they do not
belong to the IM applications themselves, they play a crucial role in project:





This appendix includes the sequence diagrams that model the normal oper-
ation of the instant messengers, as well as the reliability mechanisms. These
were used as a guide for the implementation.
3.1 D-Erlang Instant Messenger
The reliability of the system is achieved by the implementation of a series
of monitoring processes called supervisors. In the case of the D-Erlang
architecture there are (at least) two of these supervisor processes: (at least)
one at router node and (at least) another one at server node.
There are several situations in which the system can behave in an unde-
sirable manner, mostly due to bad calls, or processes that finish for reasons
other than a normal exit call sent to a process to finish. In these cases, the
supervisors must recover the system, taking it again to a valid state. Some
of these misbehaviours of the system and how the supervisors tackle them
are detailed below.
3.1.1 Handling Exceptions
A client tries to log in to the system when it is logged in already
1. Router process forwards the request to server supervisor.
2. server supervisor then spawns a new client monitor process.
3. This new client monitor queries the Client DB to check that the client
is not already registered in the system.
4. Client DB then sends a message to the new client monitor informing
that the client is already logged in.
15
Figure 3.1: Illegal login sequence diagram.
Figure 3.2: Illegal chat session sequence diagram.
5. Finally, the newly created client monitor notifies the client and server supervisor,
and terminates.
A client tries to establish a chat session with another client to
whom it already has an opened chat session
1. server supervisor process spawns a new chat session process.
2. This newly created chat session queries the Chat Session DB to ensure
that it does not exist already.
3. The Chat Session DB sends a message to the new chat session process
indicating that it exists already.
4. The new chat session process then notifies the error to both: the client
who requested the chat session, and the server supervisor, and termi-
nates.
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Figure 3.3: Chat session recovery from crash sequence diagram.
chat session process crashes before the session is finished
1. A system error message {error, Reason} is sent to server supervisor.
2. As soon as server supervisor traps this message, it works out what
clients were involved in this faulty chat session. A query to Chat Session DB
including the Pid of the faulty process trapped in the message should
be enough to do so.
3. Next, it deletes this crashed session from the Chat Session DB.
4. Finally, the Server Supervisor spawns a new Chat Session process us-
ing the information gathered, and
5. notifies the clients the Pid of the new chat session process.
server supervisor process crashes
1. router supervisor receives a system error message {error, Reason},
and as soon as this error is trapped,
2. the router supervisor spawns a new server supervisor process.
3. The new server supervisor requests the active sessions and clients to
the Chat Session DB and Clients DB.
4. As soon as the new server supervisor collects the information about
the pertinent clients and sessions, it starts monitoring the appropriate
client monitor and chat session processes.
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Figure 3.4: Server supervisor recovery sequence diagram.
Figure 3.5: Databases recovery sequence diagram.
Chat Session DB or Client DB fails In this case, the courses of ac-
tion are the same for both, thus we will just indicate DB to refer either
Chat Session DB or Client DB.
1. System sends a an error message to the server supervisor.
2. The supervisor traps this error and spawns a new DB process.
3. Once the DB is started, it fetches the data from a replica, to get into
the same state as it was before it crashed.
3.1.2 Normal Behaviour
On the other hand, during the normal execution of the system there is also
a constant flow of messages that characterises the behaviour of the instant
messenger:
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Figure 3.6: Login sequence diagram.
Client login
1. Client sends a login request message to router process.
2. router process selects a server node and forwards the request to the
corresponding server supervisor process.
3. This server supervisor spawns a client monitor, and
4. this client monitor queries the Client DB to find out whether the
client is already logged in or not.
5. If the client is not logged in yet, then Client DB informs the client monitor
that the client is not logged in. Then client monitor registers the client
in the Clients DB, and
6. notifies the client that login has been successful.
Chat session
1. Client 1 sends a start chat session message to router process,
who
2. forwards the request to the server supervisor ;
3. this supervisor then spawns a chat session process.
4. The created chat session process queries the Chat Sessions DB to en-
sure that it does not exist already.
5. In normal circumstances, Chat Sessions DB answers that the session
does not exist, and
6. chat session process, informs the involved clients the success of the
operation.
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Figure 3.7: Chat session sequence diagram.
7. Once the chat session is established, the clients send messages to each
other.
8. To finish a chat session, one of the clients sends a finish chat session
message to the chat session process.
9. chat session removes the chat session from the Chat Sessions DB, and
right after that
10. it notifies the clients.
11. Finally, chat session process sends a {exit, session finished}
message to the server supervisor, and terminates.
Client logout
1. Client sends a logout request message to its client monitor process.
2. When client monitor traps the request, it deletes the client from the
Client DB,
3. and notifies the client that logout has been successful.
4. Finally, client monitor terminates.
In this case, the client has not active chat sessions when it logs out.
However, if the client crashes or logs out while chatting, the sequence of
events is slightly different. In this case,
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Figure 3.8: Logout sequence diagram.
Figure 3.9: Logout sequence diagram.
1. the client monitor receives either a logout request or an {error,
Reason} message. In both cases
2. client monitor unregisters the client from the Client DB.
3. Right after the client is removed from the database, the client monitor
sends a finish chat session request to the chat session process,
which would finish the session in a normal way.
4. Finally, the client monitor traverses all the entries in the Chat Session DB
to discover all the sessions the client was involved, and finish them
sendind the corresponding finish chat session message (cf. chat
session description).
3.2 SD-Erlang Instant Messenger
As in the case of the D-Erlang instant messenger system (cf. Section 3.1), the
SD-Erlang version of the system has also different mechanisms to ensure the
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Figure 3.10: Illegal login sequence diagram.
reliability of the system. This reliability is achieved, as in the previous case,
implementing monitoring processes called supervisors. The SD-Erlang
architecture contains (at least) three of these supervisor processes: (at least)
one at router node, a second one (at least) at subrouter node, and (at least)
another one at server node.
The following paragraphs describe different situations in which the nor-
mal operation of the system is compromised, and the ways the system re-
covers from this abnormal behaviour:
1. A client tries to log in to the system when it is logged in already.
(a) Router process forwards the request to subrouter process.
(b) The subrouter process then forwards the request to the server supervisor,
(c) and this server supervisor spawns a new client monitor process.
(d) This new client monitor queries the Client DB to check that the
client is not already registered in the system.
(e) Client DB then sends a message to the new client monitor in-
forming that the client is already logged in.
(f) Finally, the newly created client monitor notifies the client and
server supervisor, and terminates.
2. A client tries to establish a chat session with another client to whom
it already has an opened chat session.
(a) server supervisor spawns a new chat session process.
(b) This newly created chat session queries the Chat Session DB to
ensure that it does not exist already.
(c) The Chat Session DB sends a message to the new chat session
process indicating that it exists already.
(d) The new chat session process then notifies both: the client who
requested the chat session, and the server supervisor, and termi-
nates.
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Figure 3.11: Illegal chat session sequence diagram.
Figure 3.12: Chat session recovery from crash sequence diagram.
3. chat session process crashes before the session is finished.
(a) A system error message {error, Reason} is sent to the server supervisor
process.
(b) As soon as this server supervisor traps the error message, it works
out what clients were involved in this faulty chat session. A
query to Chat Session DB including the PID of the faulty process
should be enough to do so.
(c) Next, this crashed session is removed from the Chat Session DB.
(d) Finally, the Server Supervisor, spawns a new Chat Session pro-
cess with the information gathered, and
(e) notify the clients the new Pid of the chat session process.
4. router process crashes
(a) router supervisor traps the error message {error, Reason},
and
(b) query the supervisor DB, the Supervisor DB to fetch the Pid of
the process supervised by the failed router process.
(c) Finally, the router supervisor spawns a new router process, and
23
Figure 3.13: Router process recovery sequence diagram.
Figure 3.14: Subrouter supervisor process recovery sequence diagram.
(d) this new spawned process is linked to the subrouter process that
was supervised by the failed process.
5. subrouter supervisor process crashes
(a) router process receives an {error, Reason} message from the
failed subrouter supervisor.
(b) As soon as this error message is trapped, the router process queries
the supervisor DB, to retrieve the Pid of the subrouter supervisor
process monitored by the failed subrouter supervisor.
(c) As in the previous case, a new subrouter supervisor is spawned,
and
(d) linked to the subrouter process that was supervised by the failed
process.
6. subrouter process crashes
In this case, the recovery logic is much the same as when a router process
crashes:
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Figure 3.15: Subrouter process recovery sequence diagram.
(a) subrouter supervisor traps the error message {error, Reason},
and
(b) query the supervisor DB, the Supervisor DB to fetch the Pid of
the process supervised by the failed subrouter process.
(c) Again, the subrouter supervisor spawns a new subrouter process,
and
(d) this new spawned process is linked to the server supervisor that
was supervised by the failed process.
7. server supervisor process crashes
(a) subrouter process receives a system error message {error, Reason},
and as soon as this error is trapped, the subrouter process
(b) spawns a new server supervisor process.
(c) the new server supervisor requests the active sessions and the
clients to the Chat Session DB and Clients DB.
(d) As the new server supervisor collects the clients and sessions, it
starts monitoring the corresponding client monitor and chat session
processes.
8. Chat Session DB or Client DB fails. In this case, the courses of action
are the same for both, thus we will just indicate DB to refer either
Chat Session DB or Client DB. This schema is also applied to the
Supervisor DB data structures metioned in cases 4, 5, and 6. We
will not describe the case to not overload the reader with redundant
information.
(a) System sends a an error message to the server supervisor.
(b) The supervisor traps this error and spawns a new DB process.
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Figure 3.16: Server supervisor recovery sequence diagram.
Figure 3.17: Databases recovery sequence diagram.
(c) Once the DB is started, it fetches the data from a replica, to get
into the same state as it was before it crashed.
On the other hand, during the normal execution of the system there
is also constant a flow of messages that characterises the behaviour of the
instant messenger:
1. Client login.
(a) Client sends a log-in request message to router process.
(b) The router process forwards this message to a subrouter process
that
(c) forwards the request to the corresponding server supervisor pro-
cess.
(d) This server supervisor spawns a client monitor, and
(e) this client monitor queries the Client DB to find out whether the
client is logged in or not.
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Figure 3.18: Login sequence diagram.
(f) If the client is not logged in yet, then Client DB informs the
client monitor that the client is not logged in. Then client monitor
registers the client in the Clients DB, and
(g) notifies the client that login has been successful.
2. Chat session.
(a) Client 1 sends a start chat session message to router pro-
cess, who
(b) forwards the request to a subrouter process, which in turn will
(c) forward the request to a server supervisor. This supervisor spawns
a chat session process.
(d) The created chat session process queries the Chat Sessions DB
to ensure that it does not exist already.
(e) In normal circumstances, Chat Sessions DB answers that the ses-
sion does not exist, and
(f) chat session process, informs the involved clients the success of
the operation.
(g) Once the chat session is established, the clients send messages to
each other.
(h) To finish a chat session, one of the clients sends a finish chat session
message to the chat session process.
(i) chat session removes the chat session from the Chat Sessions DB,
and right after that
(j) it notifies the clients.
(k) Finally, chat session process sends a {exit, session finished}
message to the server supervisor, and
(l) terminates.
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Figure 3.19: Chat session sequence diagram.
Figure 3.20: Logout sequence diagram.
3. Client logout
(a) Client sends a log-out request message to client monitor process.
(b) When client monitor traps the request, it deletes the client from
the Client DB,
(c) and notifies the client that logout has been successful.
(d) Finally, client monitor terminates.
In this case, the client has not active chat sessions when it logs out.
However, if the client crashes or logs out while chatting, the sequence
of events is slightly different. In this case,
(a) the client monitor receives either a logout request or an {error,
Reason} message. In both cases
(b) client monitor unregisters the client from the Client DB.
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Figure 3.21: Logout sequence diagram.
(c) Right after the client is removed from the database, the client monitor
sends a finish chat session request to the chat session pro-
cess, which would finish the session in a normal way.
(d) Finally, the client monitor traverses all the entries in the Chat Session DB
to discover all the sessions the client was involved, and finish them




Changes to the Original
Design
The implementation of the system tries to fulfil the different behaviours de-
scribed on the section 3.1 Reliability mechanisms and messages flow. How-
ever, due to the constraints imposed by the language, and decisions taken
at implementation time, the final system does not reproduce exactly the
actions depicted on this document. This section enumerates such changes,
while also offering some additional information.
1. A client tries to log in to the system when it is logged in already.
When a client, logs in to the system, it is also locally registered in
the node in which is executing. Hence, if the client tries to log in
again in that node, the first thing it does is to check whether there is
a registered process in that node with the same name. If that is the
case, then the login action is aborted and an error message informs of
this situation. If the client tries to log in from another node, then the
sequence described in section 3.1 is executed.
2. A client tries to establish a chat session with another client to whom
it already has an opened chat session.
The final implemented version does not make any explicit start session
calls to start a chat session. That is, the client does not have to per-
form a chat session request before being able to send any messages to
another client.
Client processes keep track of the chat sessions they are participat-
ing. Every time a client receives {Sender, Receiver, Message,
Send Message}, it tries to retrieve the pid of that chat session from
their internal opened sessions storage.
If there is not such chat session, the client sends a chat session request
to the server supervisor process. The server supervisor spawns the
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chat session process, returns the pid to the client, and then the client
sends the message. If that session exists already, the client sends the
message to the corresponding chat session process. Therefore, this
situation cannot happen.
3. chat session process crashes before the session is finished
This is probably the situation where the original design differs the most
respect to the final implementation. Due to the way in which the chat
sessions are started (i.e., they do not have to be set up explicitly),
there is no need of handling this error and recover the process: when
the next message is sent, a new chat session will be spawned. For that
reason, the recovery strategy consists of behaving as if the chat session
process finished normally.
4. server supervisor process crashes.
When the router process traps an abnormal termination of the server supervisor,
it only knows the pid of this crashed process. Even though it is possible
to access the the client db and chat db processes –as they are globally
registered processes– it was decided to keep a record of the monitored
processes by the server supervisor on a separate monitored db process
to make the recovery sequence faster. This monitored db process is
similar to the other db processes, but it is registered locally inside the
server node.
The recovery strategy involves the spawning of a new server supervisor
process, and the traversal of this monitored db, instead of traversing
the client and chat databases to retrieve the required information.
In fact, this is actually the strategy proposed for the recovery of the
router process, subrouter supervisor and subrouter process processes in
the SD-Erlang version of the system (cf. section 3.2).
5. Chat Session DB or Client DB fails.
There was introduced an improvement, respect to the original strat-
egy. If the crashed database is the main, during the recovery strat-
egy, main and replica databases are swapped. The reason is that if
any other process needs to access the information stored while the
database is recovering, it is available since the swapping requires only
one operation.
6. Client login
Changes at this level have been pointed out already. The original
proposal assumed two explicit operations:
(a) Start the client process.
(b) Execute the login.
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The actual implementation only requires the second. When the user
executes the function
client:login(atom()),
this function starts a client which self-logs in following the sequence
described in Figure 3.6.
7. router supervisor crashes.
The original reliability model did not contemplate this failure. The
most sensible way to tackle this situation is to make a ¡¡keep alive¿¿
process. However, after facing several problems, a less efficient but sim-
ilarly effective tactic was implemented. At launch time, router supervisor
spawns and monitors a sister process, whose function is only to monitor
the router supervisor. This router supervisor monitor process keeps
the same information as the monitored process, at any time. Thus
when the router supervisor finishes unexpectedly, the monitor process
spawns a new process, feeding the information of the processes that
need to be monitored.
When the router supervisor monitor crashes, the router supervisor spawns
a new one, feeding the information into the newly spawned process.
8. client process crashes.
Since the client side is not of the interest of this research, section
3.1 does not include the case of the unexpected termination of client
processes. However, this circumstance also has effects at the server
side. In particular, it is necessary to terminate the chat sessions in
which this crashed client is taking part, as well as remove the client
from the Clients DB. Thus, client monitor also traps these abnormal
termination of client processes behaving as if the client has logged out
normally.
9. SD-Erlang Router/Subrouter processes. The original design included
a layer of routers and then a second layer of slave routers that would be
in charge of monitoring the servers. At the moment of the implemen-
tation it was seen that the top layer of routers did not any advantages
and, potentially it could be a bottleneck. For this reasons, the final




This chapter describes the results of the tests made on the instant messenger
applications.
5.1 Experimental Setup
All the measurements have been taken using the GPG cluster located at
the University of Glasgow School of Computing Sciences. This is a Beowulf
cluster composed of 20 nodes, of which 17 are used. The reason is that there
are three nodes that can be used by any member of the school without prior
notice, and this circumstance can contaminate the results obtained.
Each of the nodes in the cluster has the following configuration:
 16 cores (2×Intel Xeon E5-2640 2 GHz).
 64 GB RAM (4 GB RAM/core).
 300 GB local disk.
 10 Gb Ethernet interconnect
The software configuration of these nodes is as follows:
 Scientific Linux 6 (Carbon) 64-bit.
 Erlang/OTP 17.4 (modified by the RELEASE project), downloaded
and built from the RELEASE Github repository.
5.2 Experiment 1: Impact of the Number of Servers
with No Failures
Design. In the first experiment we analyse whether there are differences in
throughput between the Distributed Erlang version of the instant messenger
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Figure 5.1: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum throughput time series.
(D-IM) and the Scalable Distributed Erlang version of the instant messenger
(SD-IM). For that we gradually increase the number of server nodes (3, 4,
6, 8, 12, 16) while keeping the number of router nodes fixed – equal to one.
The reliability is not considered in this experiment
This setup results identical architectures for both IM applications, since
the SD-IM only has one s group. Hence, s group operations in the SD-IM
are analogous to the global operations in the D-IM. Traffic is injected at
same rates in all conditions. Traffic generation is modelled after [XGT07].
Results. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the throughput for all the ar-
chitectures considered, in time series of 15 minutes each. It can be observed
that it takes about six minutes for the throughput to become stable. This
can be due to the implementation of the traffic generation logic. Traffic is
started by the traffic generators in a big initial burst. Despite the fact that
messages are sent at random times between one and 20 seconds, during the
first minutes messages may be overloading the queues of processes at the
server nodes (e.g., server supervisor or chat db processes). As chat sessions
are taking place, the traffic becomes more uniform and the size of these
queues diminishes.
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Figure 5.2: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum mean throughput when
applications are stable.
Figure 5.1 also show the way the IM applications scale. Considering
that the Y-axis show the number of messages per minute that go through the
architecture, the first evident fact is that the differences between technologies
(D-Erlang and SD-Erlang) are minimal, if any. More interesting, though is
the linear relationship between the number of messages per minute and
the number of server nodes present. This figure suggests that these server
nodes have an effective capacity of handling approximately 106 messages
per minute. In fact, the mean values of the delivered messages when the
applications are stable seem to reinforce this ratio (Figure 5.2).
A closer inspection of Figure 5.2 shows that the number of messages that
each of these server nodes is able to handle decreases as the number of server
nodes increases. Hence, in architectures up to eight server nodes, these
handle slightly more than the already mentioned 106 messages. Conversely,
in larger architectures the server nodes are able to handle slightly fewer
messages than 106.
Considering the architectures tested altogether, an independent sam-
ples test indicates that the mean throughput of the SD-IM (916,234 mes-
sages/minute) is larger than the throughput of the D-IM (765,351 mes-
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sages/minute; p <0.5). However, this result must be handled carefully.
This same independent samples test applied to each of the different archi-
tectures considered, shows that SD-IM has an statistically significant higher
throughput than D-IM only for those architectures comprised of four and
six server nodes. Since for the rest of the conditions throguhputs seem to
be the same, it is safer to assume that there are no performance differences
between the applications, and that these differences must be caused for some
unspecific random factor.
5.3 Experiment 2: Impact of the Number of Servers
& S groups with No Failures
Design. The second experiment analyses the differences in throughput
between the D-IM and the SD-IM when the number of servers varies, but
the number of routers is kept constant. That is a 2×3 factorial design with
factors technology –namely, Distributed Erlang and Scalable Distributed
Erlang— and number of server nodes –with three levels: 6, 8, and 12.
The number of router nodes was fixed to two. This allows the creation
of two s groups in the SD-IM that vary in size according to the number
of server nodes present in each of the experimental conditions. Therefore,
the s groups in the case of the SD-IM were composed of one router and
three, four or six servers, depending on the level of the variable number of
server nodes under test. As in the case of Experiment 1, reliability is not
considered in this experiment.
Results. Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the throughput in the different
configurations of the instant messenger architectures through a time series of
15 minutes. As in the case of the previous experiment it takes approximately
6 minutes for the applications to become stable. Once the applications
reach stability, they show constant differences in throughput only in the
experiment with two router and eight server nodes architecture.
When the number of server nodes is set to eight, these differences are
statistically significant (p <0.05) although the throughput of SD-IM is only
a 2% higher than the throughput of D-IM. In turn, when the number of
servers is six and 12 these differences in throughput disappear (p >0.05).
These later results seem to indicate that the differences found in the case
of eight server nodes might be caused for some external factor such as the
state of the cluster when the tests were running. In this sense, Figure 5.4
shows more clearly this peak in the throughput of SD-IM when the number of
server nodes is eight. However, the overlapping of the mean throughputs in
the other two considered conditions, reinforce the idea that in the difference
found is due to an external factor.
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Figure 5.3: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum throughput time series.
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Figure 5.4: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum mean throughput when
applications are stable.
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This is not the only effect observed. Figure 5.4 also shows the ideal
growth rate as the number of server nodes scale. Figure 5.2 shows that in
the case of six and eight servers, the throughput of both D-IM and SD-IM
are above this ideal. However, the introduction of one more router node
seems to impact the maximum throughput of the applications, according to
the throughput rates described by Figure 5.4.
This is clear in the case of both D-IM and SD-IM, where the throughput
is below the ideal for all the considered conditions. In this sense, Experiment
1 showed that in the case of architectures with one router and 12 server
nodes throughput was below the ideal as well. However, when a second
router node is introduced, the observed throughput for both applications is
not only below the ideal, but also lower than the case of only one router
architectures (cf. Figure 5.2).
5.4 Experiment 3: Impact of the Number of S groups
with No Failures
Design. This third experiment intends to determine the differences in
throughput between the D-IM and the SD-IM when the number of routers
varies, but the number of servers is kept constant. As in the case of the
Experiment 2 this is a 2×2 factorial design with factors technology –namely,
Distributed Erlang and Scalable Distributed Erlang— and number of router
nodes –with four levels: 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The number of server nodes was fixed to 12. This allows the creation of
diffferent number of s groups in the SD-IM that vary in size according to the
number of router nodes present in each of the experimental conditions. This
way, the s groups in the case of the SD-IM were composed of one router and
3, 4, 6, or 12 servers, depending on the level of the variable number of router
nodes under test. As in the case of the previous experiments, reliability is
not considered in this experiment.
Results. Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the throughput, in a 15 minutes
long time series, for the different architectures considered. As in the previous
cases the throughput becomes stable after 6 minutes.
The results obtained in this experiment seem to confirm the existence
of an effect of the number of routers and the number of s groups in the
throughput of the IM applications. Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show that the
highest throughput correspond to the IMs that only have one router. As the
number of routers increase, the throughput decrease. Yet this decline is dif-
ferent attending to the type of technology involved. This way, the difference
in the throughput between a D-IM architecture composed of one router and
12 servers, and another composed of two routers and 12 servers is roughly a
6%, and statistically significant (p <0.05). However, the differences between
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Figure 5.5: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum throughput time series.
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Figure 5.6: D-IM vs SD-IM. Maximum mean throughput when
applications are stable.
the two routers architecture and the subsequent three and four routers archi-
tectures are minimal and non-significant (p >0.05). In fact, Figure 5.6 show
how D-IM throughput remains constant as the number of routers grows.
This routers effect is more evident in the case of the SD-IM. Indeed, in
this case the addition of a new router node causes a statistically significant
reduction of the throughput (p <0.05). In case of the 4 router architecture
this difference is around a 12% respect to the 1 router architecture.
Figure 5.6 also suggests that the introduction of new s groups penalise
the throughput of the IM application. When a second router node is in-
troduced, the reduction in the throughput of D-IM and SD-IM is similar
(p >0.05). However, the more routers are introduced, the greater the dif-
ferences in their throughputs (p <0.05 for both three and four routers). If
there were no effect of the number of s groups these differences should remain
constant and non-significant. Moreover, since the differences in throughput
between SD-IM three routers and SD-IM four routers (which implies the
presence of three and four s groups respectively) are significant as well (p
<0.05), seems clear that the number of s groups has an additional impact
in the performance of the IM application.
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5.5 Experiment 4: Impact of Failures
Design. In the Experiment 4 we analyse fault-tolerance of the IM appli-
cations. We compare two conditions: control, in which the system runs
free of failures for 15 minutes, and treatment, in which different random IM
processes are terminated at an interval of 15 seconds (i.e., fault rate is 240
failures per hour). Faults were introduced after five minutes of the start of
the experimental trials, once the applications are stable. This means that
in the case of the experimental conditions, failures were present only from
minute 5 to minute 15. Again there are two levels of the technology variable,
namely, D-Erlang and SD-Erlang.
The architecture used for this experiment consisted of two router nodes
and 12 server nodes, making 14 nodes in total. In the case of the RSD-IM
(R meaning reliable) this generates an architecture with three s groups: one
router s group and two server s groups. This architecture is kept constant
for the whole experiment.
Again the dependent variable is throughput, measured as the number
of delivered messages in one minute. The traffic load is the maximum sup-
ported for these architectures, as determined in Experiment 3.
Results. Figure 5.7 shows the evolution of the throughput during the
whole experiment, in the presence and absence of failures, for both RD-IM
and RSD-IM applications.
The results show that SD-Erlang can be used to build reliable applica-
tions in the same fashion as D-Erlang. Moreover, the use of s groups do
not impose any special restriction to the default reliability mechanisms with
which Erlang/OTP is shipped. Recall that the RSD-IM is just a refactored
version of the RD-IM, which introduces the minimum necessary changes re-
quired to use the s groups functionality. Apart from this, no further changes
were made – especially regarding the supervision trees and fault-tolerance
mechanisms.
Thus, two important considerations can be extracted: firstly, it is pos-
sible to build fault-tolerant applications using SD-Erlang in the same way
as with D-Erlang. Secondly, s groups neither impose additional costs, nor
require additional mechanisms to support fault tolerance. These assertions
are backed by Figures 5.8 - 5.10.
Figure 5.8 shows a summary of the mean throughputs for all the con-
ditions. As it can be seen, they all are practically identical. In fact, two-
samples means tests show that there are not statistically significant differ-
ences in throughput between RD-IM and RSD-IM (p >0.05; cf. Figure 5.9)
as well as between the presence and absence of faults (p>0.05; cf. Figure
5.10) when the fault rate is 240 faults per hour.
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Figure 5.7: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Throughput time series in absence and
presence of faults.
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Figure 5.8: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Mean trhoughput in absence and presence
of failures.
44
Figure 5.9: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Mean throughput in absence and presence
of faults (intra-technology).
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Figure 5.10: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Mean throughput in absence and
presence of faults (inter-technology).
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5.6 Experiment 5: Impact of the Rate of Failures
Design. Experiment 5 explores the maximum fault rate supported by the
benchmarks. This time all the experimental series introduce faults, but these
are introduced, depending on the experimental condition, every 15, 10, and
five seconds (i.e., fault rates 240, 360, and 720 faults per hour, respectively).
These faults consisted in the termination of random IM processes (one at
a time) as in Experiment 4. Two more ad-hoc experimental series were
run. In this case, faults consisted of the termination of globally registered
databases (i.e., client database and chat session database processes). The
faults were introduced at time intervals of five seconds and one second, (i.e.,
this means that fault rates were 720 and 3600 faults per hour, respectively).
The reason for focusing the faults on the globally registered processes is
justified based on one of the SD-Erlang raisons d’ere: to improve scalability
substituting global operations for more local analogous s group operations.
In this case the dependent variable is again throughput measured as
delivered messages per minute. The independent variables are technology
(two levels: D-Erlang and SD-Erlang) and fault rate (three levels: 240,
360, and 720 faults per hour). As in the case of Experiment 4, faults were
introduced after five minutes of the start of the experimental series, once
the applications are stable. For the ad-hoc experimental series fault rate has
two levels only: 720 and 3600 faults per hour.
Systems architectures and systems loads are the same as in Experiment
4.
Results. Figure 5.11 shows the evolution of throughput at the different
fault rates considered for both RD-IM and RSD-IM.
These results together with the results plotted in Figure 5.12, indicate
that RD-IM and RSD-IM performances are similar for all the fault rates
considered. The exception may be perhaps 3600 faults per hour when only
registered databases are terminated (1 Seconds DB only) where RSD-IM
appears to have a slightly smaller throughput than RD-IM.
In fact, a two independent samples analysis on technology variable only
shows that there are not statistically significant differences between them in
throughput (p >0.01; cf. Figure 5.13. This analysis considers the through-
put means for all conditions grouped by the two levels of the variable techol-
ogy).
A similar test on the variable type of failure shows that, initially, there
are not differences in throughput, no matter whether the faulty processes
are only name-registered processes or not (p >0.01; cf. Figure 5.13).
A two-way ANOVA with factors technology and fault rate also confirms
that there are not statistical effects of any of them nor their interaction
on the throughput (p>0.01). Thus, it is safe to affirm that both RD-IM
and RSD-IM are fault tolerant, and survive in the same way all the faulty
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Figure 5.11: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Throughput time series at different fault
rates.
48
Figure 5.12: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Mean trhoughput in absence and
presence of failures.
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Figure 5.13: RD-IM vs RSD-IM. Mean throughput in when faulty
processes are any IM process and registered databases only.
conditions considered. These results together with the results of Experi-
ment 4 also indicate that RD-IM and RSD-IM do not get any penalty in
performance when fault rates are as high as 3600 faults per hour.
It was mentioned earlier that RSD-IM seemed to have a slightly smaller
throughtput when the fault rate was 3600 faults per hour and the faulty
processes were the registered databases only. Figure5.13 shows also a very
tiny step when only these faulty processes are considered (columns on the
right). This seems to suggest that even though RSD-IM is fault tolerant, its
performance in terms of throughput is worse than the RD-IM performance.
To explore this circumstance further, two additional Mann-Whitney non-
parametric tests were carried out: one to check whether there are differences
between RD-IM and RSD-IM when the fault rate is 720 faults per hour, and
the other to make the same check when the fault rate is 3600 faults per hour.
None of them were statistically significant (p >0.01). Hence, the difference
shown in the graph must be due to the size of the sample (N = 10 for each
of the four conditions).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this report we present design and evaluation of two versions of an IM
application. The first version (D-IM) is implemented in distributed Erlang.
The second version (SD-IM) is a result of refactoring of D-IM with minimal
required changes. While the purpose of the IM application is two benchmark
distributed Erlang and SD Erlang, the design complies with all main prin-
ciples of an IM application. The traffic generator was also built to closely
mimic human interaction in an IM application (Section 2).
This is also the first benchmark where we evaluate impact of failures
in distributed and SD Erlang applications. The results show that on a
small scale (up to 12 nodes) RD-IM and SD-IM behave identically, and SD
Erlang applications require no additional reliability mechanisms. Thus, the
benchmarks behave identically event when killing one globally registered
database per second over a 15 minute period (Figure 5.11).
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